

Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY

9489/03

Paper 3 Historical Interpretations

For examination from 2027

SPECIMEN PAPER

1 hour 15 minutes



You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
 - Section A: The origins of the First World War
 - Section B: The Holocaust
 - Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [].

This document has **6** pages. Any blank pages are indicated.

Answer **one** question from **one** section only.

Section A: The origins of the First World War

- 1 Read this extract and then answer the question that follows it.

In December 1920 Lloyd George made a famous speech in which he argued that the nations had ‘drifted, or rather staggered and stumbled’ into war. As late as 1936 he still maintained, ‘No monarch or leading statesman in any country sought or desired war – certainly not a European war.’ This ‘slide to war’ thesis makes careful examination of the July Crisis unnecessary: no motive, no intention, no responsibility. I suggest instead a consistent pattern, multiple instances of moves for engagement, and argue that the very essence of decision-making is a matter of choice.

And so it was in 1914. For decades European leaders had thought about how conflict might occur on the Continent. In each case, they rejected the notion that a war could be localised or isolated. They recognised the danger of diplomatic disputes escalating into armed conflict. They knew the dangers of a general European war. In each case they accepted those risks and dangers in July and August, and they decided for war with the full expectation of winning and thereby solving the problems that prompted them to consider armed conflict in the first place. That is what made the July Crisis radically different from previous crises, such as the two Moroccan crises, the two Balkan wars, and the Tripoli crisis. In fact, there was a surprising single-mindedness of purpose in the decision-makers of 1914. They recognised that the strategic argument of perceived decline or threat implied a move to war. The murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand quickly disappeared from their considerations. Instead, the leaders in Vienna and Berlin, St Petersburg and Paris, persisted in their view that war alone could resolve their perceived vulnerable positions in the European balance of power. And when two monarchs, Wilhelm II and Nicholas II, at the last moment tried to pull back from the brink, those within governing circles in Berlin and St Petersburg forced them back on course.

The ‘slide to war’ thesis is also disproven by the various actions, especially in the three critical capitals – Vienna, Berlin and St Petersburg – to block possible mediation of the crisis. As early as 3 July Berchtold boldly informed the German ambassador in Vienna of his government’s need for a ‘final and fundamental reckoning’ with Serbia. Kaiser Wilhelm endorsed that with his note, ‘now or never’. Vienna refused a state funeral for Franz Ferdinand in part because it might have offered the crowned heads of Europe an opportunity to coordinate their responses to the assassination. Vienna was determined to punish Serbia; Berlin approved that initiative. And once Russia had decided to block the proposed attack on Serbia, Foreign Minister Sazonov prevented further discussion and possible resolution of the crisis by instructing General Ianushkevich, the chief of the General Staff, to smash his telephone!

Perhaps the last word on the ‘slide to war’ thesis should go to one of those most centrally involved, the chief of the German General Staff. Already in March 1913, Moltke confided to the Italian military attaché Germany’s intention to violate Belgian neutrality in case of war. The next war, he stated, would be between France and Germany. In brutal terms, he asserted that this war would be ‘a question of life or death for us. We shall stop at nothing to gain our aims. In the struggle for existence, one does not bother about the methods one uses.’ And in retirement in June 1915, Moltke in a private letter spoke openly of ‘this war which I prepared and initiated’. No drift, no slide.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the origins of the First World War to explain your answer.

[40]

Section B: The Holocaust

2 Read this extract and then answer the question that follows it.

It is perfectly possible that Hitler began to deport German Jews because he wished to believe, or wished others to believe, that Operation Typhoon, the offensive on Moscow that began in October 1941, would bring the war to an end. Hitler claimed as much in a speech on 3 October: 'The enemy is broken and will never rise again!' If the war was truly over, then the Final Solution, as a programme of deportations for the postwar period, could begin.

Though Operation Typhoon brought no final victory, the Germans went ahead anyway with the deportations of German Jews to the East, which began a type of chain reaction. The need to make room in these ghettos confirmed one mass killing method (in Riga, in occupied Latvia) and likely hastened the development of another (in Lodz, in occupied Poland). In Riga, the police commander was Friedrich Jeckeln, who had organised the first mass shooting of Jews in August in Ukraine. Now he brought his industrial shooting methods to Latvia. On a single day, 30 November 1941, fourteen thousand Jews were marched in columns to the shooting sites, forced to lie down next to each other in pits, and were then shot from above. The city of Lodz, located in the Wartheland, the largest area of Polish territory added to the Reich, was under the control of Arthur Greiser. It was now the most populous Jewish city in the Reich. Its ghetto was overcrowded before the arrival of the German Jews. It could be that the need to remove Jews from Lodz inspired Greiser, or the local SS and Security Police commanders, to seek a more efficient method of murder. The Wartheland had always been at the centre of the policy of 'strengthening Germanism'. Hundreds of thousands of Poles were to be deported beginning in 1939, to be replaced by hundreds of thousands of Germans from the Soviet Union. But the removal of the Jews, a central element of the plan to make the area racially German, had proved hard to implement. Greiser faced the problem in his district that Hitler faced in his empire: the Final Solution was officially deportation, but there was nowhere to send the Jews. By early December, a gas van was parked 50 kilometres north of Lodz, at Chelmno – the first extermination camp.

Hitler's deportation of German Jews in October 1941 suggested improvisation at the top and uncertainty below. German Jews sent to Minsk and Lodz were not themselves killed but, rather, placed in ghettos. The German Jews sent on the first transports to Riga were, however, shot upon arrival. Whatever Hitler's intentions, Jews were now being shot. Perhaps Hitler had decided by this point to murder all the Jews of Europe, including German Jews. If so, even Himmler had not yet heard of this decision. It was Jeckeln who killed the German Jews arriving in Riga, whom Himmler had *not* wished to murder. However, Himmler did set in motion, also in October 1941, a search for a new and more effective way of killing Jews. The SS began working on a new type of facility for the killing of Jews at a site known as Belzec. By November 1941 the concept was not entirely clear and machinery was not yet in place, but certain outlines of Hitler's final version of the Final Solution were visible. In the occupied Soviet Union, Jews were being shot on an industrial scale. In annexed and occupied Poland, gassing facilities were under construction. In Germany, Jews were being sent to the East, where some of them had already been killed.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: The origins and development of the Cold War

3 Read this extract and then answer the question that follows it.

When a power vacuum separates two great powers, as one did the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War, they are unlikely to fill it without bumping up against and bruising each other's interests. This would have happened even if the two had both been constitutional democracies. Victory would require difficult adjustments for Russians and Americans because so many legacies of mistrust divided them: the distinction between authoritarian and democratic traditions; the challenge communism and capitalism posed to each other. It was too much to expect a few years of wartime cooperation to sweep all this away. At the same time, though, these legacies need not have produced Soviet–American confrontation. The leaders of great nations are never entirely bound by the past: new situations arise and they are free to reject old methods in attempting to deal with them. Much would depend, therefore, on the extent to which Roosevelt and Stalin could liberate their nations' futures from their past.

The US President and his key advisers were determined to secure the United States against whatever dangers might confront it after victory, but they lacked a clear sense of what these might be or where they might arise. Their thinking about postwar security was, as a consequence, more general than specific. They certainly saw a vital interest in preventing any hostile power from again attempting to dominate the European continent. They were not prepared to see their own military capabilities reduced to anything like the inadequate levels of the interwar era, nor would they resist opportunities to reshape the international economy in ways that would benefit American capitalism. The United States would seek power in the postwar world, and it would do so in the belief that only it had the strength to build a peace on principles of self-determination, open markets and collective security.

The Soviet leader, too, sought security. His country had lost at least 27 million of its citizens in the war, so he could hardly do otherwise. But no tradition of common or collective security shaped postwar priorities as seen by the Soviet Union, where it was no longer permitted to distinguish between state interests, party interests, and the interests of Stalin himself. National security had come to mean personal security, and Stalin had already resorted to murder on a mass scale to remove any possible challengers to his regime. Cooperation with external allies was obviously to his advantage when the Germans were within sight of Moscow, but whether that cooperation would extend beyond Hitler's defeat was another matter.

In fact, the alliance fell apart within a matter of months. Geography and tradition contributed to this outcome but did not determine it. It took men, responding unpredictably to circumstances, to forge the chain of causation. And it took one man in particular, responding to his own authoritarian, paranoid and narcissistic tendencies, to lock it into place. Would there have been a Cold War without Stalin? Perhaps, but Stalin had certain characteristics that set him apart from all others in authority at the time the Cold War began. He alone had transformed his country into an extension of himself. He alone saw war and revolution as acceptable means with which to pursue ultimate ends. No Western leader associated violence with progress to the extent he did. Did he therefore seek a Cold War? The question is a little like asking, 'Does a fish seek water?' Suspicion, distrust and cynicism were not only his preferred but his necessary environment. He could not function without them.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]

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